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Abstract:  Numerous policy studies have argued that conditions have prevailed in China since the
open door economic reforms of the late 1970s that have encouraged rapid growth at the expense
of regional income inequality across the provinces of China. In this paper we use recently
developed nonstationary panel techniques to provide empirical support for the fact that the long
run tendency since the reforms has been for provincial level incomes to continue to diverge. More
importantly, we show that this divergence cannot be attributed to the presence of separate,
regional convergence clubs divided among common geographic subgroupings such as the coastal
versus interior provinces. Furthermore, we also show that the divergence cannot be attributed to
differences in the degree of preferential open-door policies. Rather, we find that the divergence is
pervasive both nationally and within these various regional and political subgroupings. We argue
that these results point to other causes for regional income divergence, and they also carry
potentially important implications for other regions of the world.
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In this study we examine China’s regional growth patterns using provincial-level income data. Many
authors have noted that regional incomes have been diverging across China at the same time that China
has opened its economy to greater international economic activity. A common argument is that the
regional divergence in incomes may be due largely to geographic factors, or to diﬀerences to which
provinces promote open-door policies. Using recently-developed nonstationary panel techniques, we
show that neither of these popular explanations is suﬃcient to explain the degree of regional divergence
that China has experienced. Rather, we argue that research should focus on more fundamental causes
linked to the mechanisms for rapid growth.
The empirical results are potentially signiﬁcant not only for China, but also for understanding the
prospects for growth and economic integration in other regions of the world that strive to develop as
rapidly as China has during the last few decades. Many of the provinces of China are comparable in
size to entire nations, not only geographically, but also in terms of population and economic activity.
Whereas regional incomes among individual U.S. states and among Western European countries are
generally seen to be converging over time, China provides an interesting case study of an example in
which regional diﬀerences have been increasing amidst rapid growth. The results of this study suggest
that mere openness to international trade in goods and services alone is not likely to be suﬃcient to
ensure regional income convergence when one takes into account production factors, such as insuﬃciently
mobile labor, as has been an issue in China until only very recently. These ﬁndings may be important for
other regional economic groups that are considering the prospects for integration in the form of greater
openness to trade in goods and services and capital ﬂows, but which have relatively limited labor
ﬂows. Important examples include the various regional economic groups in Africa, such as ECOWAS
in West Africa, CEMAC in Central Africa, COMESA and SADC in Eastern and Southern Africa, as
well as the ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia, and the Andean Community, CACM, CARICOM and
1MERCOSUR groups in the Caribbean and Latin America.
China’s experience with economic growth has changed dramatically following the reforms initiated in
1978, which introduced economic incentives and opened the economy to foreign trade and investment.
In the years prior to the reforms, real per capita income grew at 2.5% per annum. Growth during
this period was also quite erratic, with dramatic variations associated with the Great Leap Forward
and the breaking of trade relations with the Soviet Union in 1958-60. The second half of the 1960s
witnessed agricultural failures and a nationwide famine caused by the political and social chaos that
followed the Cultural Revolution. By contrast, the reforms since 1978 have unleashed a period of
unprecedented rapid and steady growth, at 8.8% per annum during 1978-97 for the economy as a whole,
and at 10.2% per annum for the coastal provinces, excluding the city provinces. The contrast in the
growth experience between these two periods can be seen readily in ﬁgure 1, which depicts real log per
capita income for the average of the 28 provincial-level localities for which data is available going back
to 1952.
In general terms, the pre-reform period 1952-77 is characterized by unsteady growth, with relatively
large ﬂuctuations in measured per capita income. These are due in large part to two distinct historical
episodes. The ﬁrst is the Great Leap Forward campaign of 1958-60 and the subsequent agricultural
failures and a nationwide famine. The second is the Cultural Revolution of 1965-68 and the ensuing
political and social chaos that followed, resutling in a large decline in growth in the latter half of the
1960s. The early 1970s were then characterized by a recovery period. By the late 1970s the growth
trend of the Chinese economy improved dramatically, and it has remained high since.
The takeoﬀ toward higher growth coincides with the process of economic reform and open-door
policies adopted in 1978. However the rapid growth has also been accompanied by a dramatic increase
in personal income inequality. This has stemmed from the increased emphasis on market incentives and
the reversal of the “iron rice bowl” policies. Based on oﬃcial statistics, the World Bank (1997) reports
2an increase in the Gini coeﬃcient to 38.8 in 1995 from 28.2 in 1981. Inequalities in rural areas have been
growing fastest although urban inequality has also risen sharply in the most recent period 1988-95.1
It should not be surprising that the transition from socialism to more market-oriented policies has
increased income inequality at the household level. But the fact that systematic income inequalities
also appear to be increasing between provinces is somewhat more perplexing. The issue is of central
concern to the Chinese authorities, as it bears directly on the success of decentralization policies and
the political cohesion of the country at the national level. In September 1995 the Chinese government
endorsed the view that regional inequalities have widened since the reforms. It stated that “since the
adoption of reforms and open-door policies, we have encouraged some regions to develop faster and get
richer, (and we have) advocated that the richer should act as a model for and help the poor. Each region
has had immense economic development and the people’s standard of living has had great improvement.
But for some reason, regional economic inequalities have widened somewhat.”2
Recently Young (2000) also provided compelling arguments and empirical evidence to support the
idea that despite the fact that China has liberalized international trade, interprovincial trade has actually
become more restrictive in the post-reform period, and that this combination can be expected to generate
large regional disparities. Some empirical studies have for the most part come to the opposite conclusion.
For example, Chen and Fleisher (1996), Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996) and Raiser (1998) generally ﬁnd
the absence of per capita income convergence among provinces during the period from 1952-77, followed
by a pattern of convergence during the post-reform period. Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996) argue that
convergence among the provinces of China has been a relatively recent phenomenon, emerging strongly
only since the post-reform period began in 1978.3 Others have argued that although provincial incomes
are still diverging, this can largely be accounted for by the fact that the interior provinces simply have
1See for example Ravallion and Jian (1999), Kahn, Griﬀen and Risken (1999) and Yang (1999) for recent discussion of
t h e s et r e n d si ni n c o m ei n e q u a l i t y .
2People’s Daily Overseas Edition, Oct. 5, 1995, p4
3Only ﬁfteen provinces in their study have GDP data for the pre-reform period 1952-77.
3not kept up with the fast-growing coastal regions, either due to diﬀerential degrees of openness to trade,
or due simply to diﬀerences in geography associated with access to the sea.
In this paper, we argue that empirical results on Chinese provincial convergence should be reeval-
uated in light of recent advances in empirical methodologies for testing convergence. Speciﬁcally, we
make use of the provincial income panel data set of Hseuh-Li (1999) and apply empirical techniques
that explicitly account for the nonstationary time series properties of the data. These techniques allow
us to obtain a fairly dramatic picture of the trends toward and away from convergence in the two pe-
riods prior to and following the economic reforms. In contrast to previous studies that have relied on
conventional cross-section techniques, we ﬁnd evidence in accordance with the more recent arguments
put forth by Young, as well as with the pragmatic observations of policymakers in China. Speciﬁ-
cally, in this study we ﬁnd strong evidence to support the idea that although real per capita incomes
were generally converging among provinces prior to the economic reforms begun in 1978, the reforms
triggered a period in which provincial real per capita incomes have since been diverging rather than
converging. Furthermore, we also investigate the relative growth patterns among regional subgroups,
as well as among subgroups of provinces that have received diﬀering degrees of preferential open-door
policy support. On the basis of this analysis, we show that the national divergence cannot easily be
explained simply on the basis of separate regional or political convergence clubs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we take a brief, informal look
at the raw data to understand the nuances involved in determining whether per capita incomes are
indeed converging or diverging among Chinese provinces in the pre and post-reform periods; next in
Section 3 we establish a more formal set of criteria for testing convergence of provincial real per capita
incomes, and we describe the empirical methodology that we employ to formally test and compare
income convergence properties before and after the reforms based on recently developed techniques for
nonstationary panel data analysis; Section 4 discusses and evaluates the results that we obtain; and
4Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Informal Analysis
In this section, we ﬁrst examine the raw data informally. The data that we use consist of provincial
GDP for twenty-eight provinces of China for the forty-ﬁve-year period 1952-97. Speciﬁcally, we use
the provincial GDP data from Hsuech and Li (1999) for the period 1952-95 and use provincial GDP
data for 1996-97 obtained from the 1997 China Statistics Real GDP per capita for each province is
computed using total population from each province and the corresponding provincial GDP deﬂators
for each province, with 1995 as the base year for the deﬂator. There are two geographic areas excluded
from the data. One is Hainan, which is a newly-established province, and the other is Tibet, for which
data are missing prior to 1987.
The most important outcome of China’s economic reform and open-door policy is its remarkable
economic growth performance. During the post-reform period China has been growing at a spectacular
rate, enabling per capita income to more than quadruple. Today China is among the fastest-growing
economies of the world. Table 2 shows that the average annual growth rate of real per capita GDP of
all provinces during the post-reform period 1978-97 is 9.09%.
The acceleration of economic growth within China’s provinces has been very broadly based. With
the exception of Beijing and Qinghai, all provinces’ average annual growth rates during the post-reform
period are higher than those of the pre-reform period. In particular, there are seven provinces—Jiangsu,
Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Henan and Xinjiang—which have more than doubled their average
annual growth rates during the post-reform period compared to the pre-reform period. However,
average annual growth rates over the last two decades of the post-reform period vary signiﬁcantly across
the provinces. As reported in table 1, the standard deviation of the provincial growth rates during the
post-reform period is higher than during the pre-reform period. The slowest growing province, Qinghai,
5only grew at an annual average rate of 5.88% during the post-reform period. However this still represents
a respectable growth rate relative to most economies or regions of the world. Heilongjiang, which is
one of the old Soviet-style heavy-industry based provinces, has been the second slowest in terms of
economic growth rates during the post-reform period, at 6.7%. Qinghai’s and Heilongjiang’s growth
performances stand in sharp contrast to the ﬁve fastest-growing coastal provinces, which have managed
to grow at double-digit rates4. We refer to these ﬁve provinces as the “ﬁve dragons.” However, in
geographic terms, it is not the case that all of the coastal provinces have been growing faster than the
interior provinces. For example, the remaining four coastal provinces— Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning and
Shanghai—have grown annually at 8.53%, 9.47%, 7.88% and 8.35%, respectively, during the post-reform
period. Among these, only Hebei exceeds the national average provincial growth rate of 9.09%. There
are ﬁve interior provinces—Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Sichuan—which have outperformed the
three coastal provinces of Tianjin, Liaoning and Shanghai. Hence having a coastal location appears not
to be the only condition necessary to foster the highest growth rates.
Next, we illustrate by graphic analysis some of the key features of the provincial growth process
during the pre-reform and post-reform periods based on the Hsueh and Li data. These illustrations
help us to gain a broad sense of the tendencies toward income convergence or divergence among China’s
twenty-eight provinces during both the pre-reform period 1952-77 and the post-reform period 1978-97
before implementing more formal tests for convergence.
One way to illustrate the provincial growth pattern is to examine Shanghai, the richest, as the
national technology leader or frontier, in comparison with those provinces which are catching up to
Shanghai, those which are falling behind, and those which are roughly growing at the same pace. Among
the coastal provinces, the group known as the "ﬁve dragons"—Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu, Shandong
and Zhejiang—have grown at a rate of more than 10% each year since 1978. Figure 2 illustrates the
4These provinces are Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong and Guangdong, with the average annual growth rates over
1978-97, respectively, given by 12.33%, 13.27%, 12.64%, 10.83% and 11.51%.
6extent to which the average per capita income of these ﬁve provinces is rapidly approaching that of
Shanghai. The ﬁgure also shows that two other provinces have clearly been lagging behind the rest.
These two provinces are Heilongjiang, the Soviet-style heavy-industrial base in the northeast of China,
and Qinghai, an inland province in the northwest of China. By the late 1980s these two provinces were
overtaken by the ﬁve dragons provinces. Figure 3 depicts how, in contrast to these eight provinces, the
remaining interior provinces appear to be growing along distinct but roughly parallel growth paths.
Many studies of the Chinese economy tend to categorize provinces simply into coastal versus interior
groups, since historically there has been a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in their relative growth rates. However,
the Hsueh and Li data show that this classiﬁcation may be inadequate in that it masks considerable
individual heterogeneity within the categories. For example, ﬁgure 4 shows that the log per capita
income gap between the coastal and interior provinces increased only slightly after 1978. By contrast,
when we compare the wealthiest and poorest of each of these classiﬁcations with the group averages of
the remaining provinces we see a diﬀerent picture. In ﬁgure 5 we see that the income gap between the
group average and the richest coastal province, Shanghai, and the poorest coastal province, Hebei, is
relatively constant over time. This appears to contradict the idea that the coastal provinces behave as
a single convergence club. Similarly, ﬁgure 6 shows that the income gap between the richest interior
province, Beijing, and the poorest interior province, Guizhou, has even increased slightly since the 1980s.
If we think of convergence as the narrowing of interprovincial income diﬀerences, it appears that
there is relatively little overall convergence among the group of all provinces when examined over
the entirety of the sample period. Furthermore, even as possible regional growth clubs, the coastal
provinces and interior provinces fail to converge within each group. As each of the ﬁgures illustrates,
per capita growth rates, reﬂected in the slopes of the logged series, while diﬀering across provinces,
appear relatively stable over time since the 1978 reforms. Accordingly, the diﬀerences in growth rates
appear to be fairly persistent, which implies that interregional income disparities are likely to continue
7to diverge.
This graphic analysis is useful in informally developing a sense of the extent of convergence or
divergence present in the data. To reconcile whether the data is actually consistent with long run
convergence or divergence in a formal sense, we next turn to a more systematic empirical analysis.
3 Panel Based Tests for Long Run Convergence
To more precisely investigate whether the data are consistent with long run convergence or divergence,
we begin with a formal deﬁnition of what we mean by the concept of long run convergence in panels
such as the Hsueh and Li data. In particular, we employ a deﬁnition of income convergence in keeping
with the one studied in Evans (1998) for an international panel of country-level data. This notion of
convergence asks whether or not the long-run forecasts for output diﬀerences converge as the forecasting
horizon increases, which implies that the long run income gap between any two provinces must be
stationary.
An important implicit distinction between this empirical formalization and the informal graphical
analysis of the previous section is that here in order to conclude in favor of convergence, we require that
the properties of the data must be consistent with the fact that diﬀerences are eliminated eventually,
and not necessarily that the diﬀerences are becoming smaller at all points in time. Clearly this
less restrictive concept for convergence is somewhat more subtle, and far more diﬃcult to detect on
the basis of a casual graphical analysis. To formalize this idea empirically, for provincial income data
which individually exhibit nonstationarities, one can characterize this criteria for convergence as follows.
Suppose that yit, the logarithm of per capita output for province i at time t,i sd i ﬀerence stationary, and
thus exhibits unit root behavior individually. Then any pair of provinces i and j are said to converge
pair-wise if the diﬀerence yit − yjt is stationary so that yit and yjt are cointegrated. Convergence
between members of a larger group of provinces is then deﬁned analogously by requiring that every
8pair within the set exhibits convergence. Note furthermore that if the stationary diﬀerences between
provinces have nonzero means, then this corresponds to the notion of conditional convergence, since the
convergence is said to be conditional upon the province-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. One obvious advantage
to this method of focusing on the properties of long run income gaps as the criteria for convergence is
that it directly allows us to infer long run forecasts for the absence or presence of income inequalities
between provinces.
For the group of Chinese provinces, one might imagine testing this condition pair-wise for all
provinces within the sample and then requiring that the condition hold for each possible pair of provinces.
An obvious disadvantage of such an approach is that conventional tests for cointegration tend to have
low power for such short samples, and so the probability of failing to reject the null of no cointegration
for at least some pairs would be quite high regardless of the true relationship. Fortunately, as Evans
(1998) demonstrates, it is possible to translate this criteria into a single criterion that should apply
to the group as a whole when interpreted as a panel. Speciﬁcally, Evans shows that the criterion of
pair-wise convergence for all members of panel is equivalent to the condition that the diﬀerence between
the individual series, yit, and the mean value for the series across all members at each point in time,
¯ yt = 1
N
PN
i=1 yit, is stationary. Thus, the condition states that all members converge pair-wise if yit−¯ yt
is stationary for each member i =1 ,2,......,N of the panel. Consequently, Evans argues that the null
of nonconvergence can be interpreted as the unit root null in panel unit root test.
Consequently, in this context, whether or not convergence is occurring can be evaluated by asking
whether or not the autoregressive parameter βi is zero for the panel data regression given by
∆(yit − ¯ yt)=μi + βi(yi,t−1 − ¯ yt−1)+
Ki X
k=1
φi,k∆(yi,t−k − ¯ yt−k)+εit (1)
for i =1 ,2,......,N; t =1 ,2,......,T . Notice that this speciﬁcation is essentially an augmented Dickey-
9Fuller regression applied to the panel of income diﬀerentials between the individual provinces and the
mean income value of the provinces as a group. In this case the μi ﬁxed eﬀects represent the individual
province’s average sample diﬀerence from the group mean (yit − ¯ yt),w h i c hi sp e r m i t t e dt ov a r yb y
province. The autoregressive parameter for the income diﬀerentials, βi, becomes the key coeﬃcient for
determining the presence or absence of convergence, the lagged diﬀerence terms are intended to capture
higher order serial correlation in the time series process for income diﬀerentials and the number of
lags, Ki, are chosen in a manner to ensure that the remaining error terms εit are serially uncorrelated.
Under this speciﬁcation, rejection of the panel unit root null hypothesis
H0 : βi =0 for all i
in favor of the alternative hypothesis
H1 : βi < 0 for some i
implies that at least some subset of the members of the panel are converging toward one another. By
contrast, failure to reject this null can be taken to imply that no subset of the members of the panel
are converging toward one another.
To test this hypothesis, we employ the panel unit root tests of Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003),
Maddala and Wu (1999). These tests have an advantage over earlier generation tests such as Breitung
and Meyer (1994), Quah (1994), and Levin and Lin (2002) in that they allow for greater ﬂexibility
under the alternative hypothesis. Speciﬁcally, both the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) and Maddala and
Wu (1999) tests allow the value for the autoregressive coeﬃcient, βi, under the alternative hypothesis
to vary across provinces. By contrast, the Levin and Lin (2002) panel unit root test employed in
10the ﬁrst generation of panel unit root convergence tests such as Evans (1998) and Evans and Karras
(1996) requires the autoregressive coeﬃcient to be homogeneous under the alternative hypothesis, so
that βi = β < 0. Thus, the more recent tests provide us with the additional ﬂexibility of allowing the
convergence dynamics to diﬀer across provinces under the alternative hypothesis, which is clearly an
advantage in the current context.
The distinction is achieved by the diﬀerence in the way the data are pooled to construct the statistics.
For example, while the earlier tests such as Levin and Lin (2002) were based on pooling along the
"within" dimension of the data, the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) tests are constructed by pooling
along the “between” dimension of the data. In practice this means that the Im, Pesaran, and Shin
tests are constructed on the basis of averaging the unit root tests for the individuals to produce a group
mean test statistic. In one such test, Im, Pesaran and Shin recommend constructing a t-bar statistic,
which is based on averaging the individual augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root t-tests. Consequently, to
compute the statistic in our context, one ﬁrst estimates the augmented Dickey-Fuller regression given
in equation (1) above individually for each of the i =1 ,2,......,28 provinces of the panel and then
constructs the 28 corresponding ADF t-statistics, ti. These individual statistics are averaged to obtain
the t-bar statistic ¯ t = 1
N
PN
i=1 ti. Finally, since the distribution for the individual ADF t-statistics are
not centered around zero under the unit root null hypothesis, it becomes necessary to adjust for this
feature to ensure that the distribution of the t-bar statistic does not diverge under the null hypothesis as
the number of individual members of the panel, N, grows large. Fortunately, under the null hypothesis,
the mean of the individual ti is a known constant as the sample size T grows large, as is the standard
deviation of the individual ti . Consequently, the t-bar statistic is adjusted by subtracting oﬀ the mean
and dividing by the standard deviation, so that the statistic becomes
¯ z =
√
N(¯ t − u)/s
11where u is the known mean of the individual ADF t-statistic distribution, and s is the known standard
deviation of the individual ADF t-statistic distribution. Provided that the individual statistics are
independent, then as Im, Pesaran, and Shin demonstrate, this statistic will be distributed as standard
normal under the null hypothesis, and will diverge to negative inﬁnity under the alternative hypothesis
so that large negative values can be taken to reject the null hypothesis.
Maddala and Wu (1999) suggest a somewhat diﬀerent approach to testing the unit root null hy-
pothesis in panels, which also allows the more ﬂexible modeling approach of the Im, Pesaran, and Shin
test under the alternative hypothesis as compared to the earlier panel unit root tests. Speciﬁcally,
Maddala and Wu suggest that rather than basing the pooled test statistic on the average value of the
individual member test statistics, one can also base the panel unit root test on pooled values of the
marginal signiﬁcance level associated with the individual member test statistics. Since the marginal
signiﬁcance levels, or “p-values” pi , for the individual tests are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1,
this implies that −2logpi is distributed as a χ2 with two degrees of freedom. For the N members of
the panel, we can sum these values to obtain the Pearson-lambda statistic, also commonly referred to





Again, under the assumption that the individual statistics are independent, the sum of N independent
χ2 with two degrees of freedom implies that the Fisher statistic is distributed as a χ2 with 2N degrees
of freedom. When a suﬃcient number of the individual p-values are small enough to indicate rejection
of the null hypothesis, then the Fisher statistic takes on increasingly large values. Thus, large positive
values in the right hand tail of the χ2
(2N) distribution indicate rejection of the unit root null hypothesis.
The cost of the Maddala and Wu approach is that the distributions for the individual ADF based
unit root tests are nonstandard and depend on Brownian motion functionals, which means that the
12p-values for arbitrary values of the t-statistics are not available in tabular form, and must be simulated.
Consequently, the approach can be very computer intensive, particularly if one wishes to condition the
p-values on the sample size and on the particular lag truncation that is ﬁtted. On the positive side,
Maddala and Wu argue that their approach does well in pointing out the role of individual members in
contributing to the overall results for the panel. In particular, it is useful to know whether the results
for the panel are generally being driven by the strength of one or two outlier members or whether it is a
general tendency of all members of the panel. For example, it is quite likely that in practice that panels
of the type that we are considering here are mixed, in the sense that within either the pre-reform or
post-reform periods, it is possible that not all members behave as if they are stationary or nonstationary.
Instead, the panels may be mixed in the sense that the majority of the members contain unit roots but
one or two do not. In this case, we would like to know the basis for the rejection of the panel as a
whole. By computing the marginal signiﬁcance levels of the members individually prior to pooling the
results, we can get a sense of whether or not this is the case.
Finally, the marginal signiﬁcance analysis associated with the Maddala and Wu approach brings
with it another important beneﬁt. Both the Im, Pesaran, and Shin t-bar test and the Maddala
and Wu Pearson-lambda test are constructed under the assumption that the income diﬀerentials are
independent of one another across provinces. But in practice, it is possible that even these diﬀerentials
contain feedback eﬀects that render them dependent upon one another across provinces. In this case,
these tests are not strictly valid. Fortunately, once the marginal signiﬁcance levels have been computed,
it is also possible to use these to produce a more conservative test that is also invariant to the presence
of cross-sectional dependency. As Maddala and Wu point out, the marginal signiﬁcance levels can be
used to construct a test based on the Dufour and Torres (1996) criteria for the Bonferroni inequality
constraint, which does not require independence across the individual members of the panel. The
Bonferroni inequality constraint indicates that the marginal signiﬁcance level P for a rejection of the
13null hypothesis H0 applied to the panel of N members is given by P ≤
PN
i=1 pi where, as before, the pi
are the marginal signiﬁcance levels for the tests applied to the individual members. Dufour and Torres
recommend using the criteria that pi = P
N , to set the rejection level. To understand the nature of the
test, consider the following. Imagine that we are interested to know whether we should reject the null
hypothesis for the panel at the 10% level. Clearly, it would be a mistake to conclude that we should
reject the hypothesis simply because a single member of a panel of N provinces produces a p-value less
than 10%. To do so would ignore the fact that for a panel of N members, we would expect to reject at
the 10% level N
10 times regardless of whether the null is false. Thus, the Dufour and Torres criteria for
the Bonferroni inequality corrects for this by indicating that conservatively, we should only reject the
null hypothesis for the panel if any one individual indicates a rejection level of P
N or stronger. The
strength of the rejection in this form is not altered by whether or not the individual test results are
correlated, and thus the test is invariant to cross sectional dependency across provinces.
Taken together, the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999) approaches provide
a nice opportunity to investigate both the individual and group provincial dynamics in terms of the
convergence hypothesis and to evaluate the contribution of individual provinces to the results for the
panel as a whole. Consequently, in what follows we combine the two approaches to form a uniﬁed
analysis of the convergence properties of per capita income in the Chinese provinces.
4 Empirical Results
In this section we present and discuss the results of the formal convergence tests described in the previous
section. We divide the sample of twenty-eight provinces into a pre-reform subsample for the period
1952-77, and a post-reform subsample, for 1978-97. We also consider various province subgroupings
to investigate the possibility of convergence clubs in the post-reform period.
To begin, the IPS t-bar test and Maddala-Wu Fisher test are applied to equation (1) for the pre-
14reform period 1952-77 and the post-reform period 1978-97, respectively. Table 3 summarizes the results
for the pre-reform period and post-reform periods. In keeping with the discussion of the previous sec-
tion, the lag truncations for the individual ADF unit root regressions were allowed to vary by individual
province in both subsamples, for both the individual tests as well as the panel based test. In each
case, the lag length was chosen by a standard data dependent step down procedure, which is typically
implemented for the ADF unit root test in conventional time series regressions. Speciﬁcally, the step
down procedure involves starting with a suﬃciently large number of lags and then sequentially elimi-
nating the highest order lags one at a time until one of them tests signiﬁcant. In our case, we allowed
this step down procedure to choose a diﬀerent lag truncation for each province. For the arbitrary
initial starting value, we rounded oﬀ to the nearest integer of 1/5 of the sample length. Thus, for the
p r e - r e f o r mp e r i o d ,w i t hT = 2 6 ,w es t a r t e dw i t ha ni n i t i a l" m a x i m u m "l a gv a l u eo f5 ,a n dt h e na l l o w e d
the automated data dependent procedure to choose the actual number of ﬁtted lags, which then varied
between 0 and 5. For the post-reform period, with T=20, we started with an initial "maximum" lag of
4, so that the actual number of ﬁtted lags then varied between 0 and 4. Since both individual and panel
unit root tests are well known to be sensitive to the number of lags ﬁt, we also experimented with using
maximum lag truncations that varied from 6 to 2 in the case of the pre-reform period and 5 to 2 in the
post-reform period. The results for the panel were not altered by these choices. Consequently, in the
interest of space, we report only the tables with results for the case with maximum truncations of 5 and
4 respectively. For the IPS tests, we conditioned the individual mean and variance adjustment terms
on both the sample size and the lag truncation value that was chosen endogenously for each individual.
Consider ﬁrst the results reported in table 3 for the pre-reform period. The ﬁrst column to the right
of the province name reports the value for the individual ADF t-statistic for the particular province.
The next column reports the associated marginal signiﬁcance level, also known as the "p-value," for
the reported ADF t-statistic. As discussed in the previous section, since the distribution for the ADF
15t-statistic is nonstandard, the p-values must be estimated by Monte Carlo simulation. Furthermore,
since the size of the test under the null hypothesis is very sensitive to the sample size, as well as the
number of ﬁtted lags, we used a bootstrap to condition the Monte Carlo simulation on both the sample
size and the speciﬁc number of lags that were ﬁtted in each case. In all cases, the simulation was based
on 20,000 draws from a pure random walk of length T+100. The ﬁrst 100 realizations of each random
walk were discarded to reduce the impact of arbitrary initial conditions, and the ADF regression was
then ﬁtted with the number of lags that had been ﬁtted according to the data dependent step down
procedure.
Notice that based on these p-values, we see that only three provinces were able to reject the unit
root null at the 5% level or better, and only six were able to reject at the 10% level or better. On
the other hand, we can also see from the p-values that the strength of the empirical evidence coming
from the individual provinces is not neutral. Rather, although the signal from any one province is
weak, it generally lies on the tail of the distribution that favors rejection over non rejection of the
null hypothesis. When this evidence is accumulated in the panel, it produces a strong enough signal
to warrent rejection of the null with much greater conﬁdence. In other words, although not many
provinces provided small enough p-values to support rejections on their own at the 5% or 10% level,
a great many provinces were able to support rejections at say the 35% level or better. Individually,
these would not be taken as suﬃcient evidence. However, the combined evidence of these marginally
supportive provinces is suﬃcient to produce a rejection for the panel as a whole. This is precisely
what the Fisher statistic of Maddala-Wu test does. It reports the combined evidence and supports a
rejection of the unit root null hypothesis at a value of 79.35, since under the unit root null hypothesis
it should be distributed as a χ2 with 56 degrees of freedom, which implies that the test value of 79.35
corresponds to a p-value of 0.022 as reported in the table. Likewise, the Im, Pesaran, and Shin T-bar
statistic produces a value of -2.23, which supports a rejection of the unit root null hypothesis, since it
16is distributed as standard normal under the unit root null hypothesis, which implies that the test value
of -2.23 corresponds to a p-value of 0.013 as reported in the table. The use of the individual p-values
helps us to conﬁrm that this rejection is not based on the unusually strong results of only one or two
outliers. Consequently, these tests support the conclusion that inter-provincial per capita incomes were
converging in the sense that incomes were converging toward one another for a signiﬁcant subset of
provinces during the pre-reform period.
Next, consider the results for the post-reform period, which are reported in table 4. For this
sub-sample, we encounter a very diﬀerent situation. Although two provinces are able to reject at the
5% level or better, and four are able to reject at the 10% level or better, the pattern for the majority of
provinces is now much diﬀerent. Rather than being close to rejections, the majority of the test statistics
are nowhere near the left tail of the distribution, and the p-values reﬂect this. Now, even the combined
evidence does not reject the null hypothesis, and both the Fisher statistic and the Im, Pesaran, and Shin
t-bar statistic reﬂect this. In both cases, the statistics are far from rejecting the null hypothesis. This
points to the likelihood that on balance, the majority of the provinces are not converging to one another
in the post-reform period since we cannot reject the panel unit root null hypothesis for the diﬀerences
(yit − ¯ yt). On the other hand, the fact that a small subset of provinces do provide rejections leads us
to consider the possibility that there may be subgroups for which convergence may be present. We also
note that at least one province provides a rejection that is marginally consistent with the Bonferroni
test at the 5% level, since pi = P
N = 0.05
28 =0 .0018.
Consequently, we next consider that the possibility that the apparent absence of convergence in
the post-reform period nationally can be attributed to the idea that at least some subsets of countries
are converging to separate regional or policy-determined clubs. Notice that the results for the full
sample of provinces already indicate that this result is unlikely, since they indicate that we cannot
reject the likelihood that there is no sizeable subset of provinces which converge pair-wise within the
17sample. Nevertheless, given the presence of sampling variation and the fact that we cannot say a
priori what constitutes a suﬃciently sizeable subset on the basis of the full sample results, it is worth
further investigating the convergence properties of candidate subsets of provinces. For example, many
researchers have proposed that diﬀerences in geography or diﬀerences in preferential open-door policies
at the provincial level may generate convergence clubs among the provinces of China. The most
commonly proposed of these has been the coastal versus interior geographic distinction. Recently,
Demurger et al. (2001) have also investigated using more traditional methods whether diﬀerences in
the level of preferential economic policy at the provincial level may help to explain patterns of growth
among the provinces. We consider both of these possibilities.
Toward this end, we ﬁrst examined various regional subgroupings for the possibility of geographically-
based convergence clubs. The designation for coastal versus interior tends to vary among studies, and
so we have experimented with a number of diﬀerent coastal versus interior classiﬁcations as well as other
regional subgroupings. As described in table 1, strictly speaking, our sample consists of ten provinces
that lie along the coast of China. Among these, the southern autonomous coastal region of Guangxi
is sometimes excluded from the coastal designation and grouped with the other southwestern interior
provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou. Likewise, the northeastern coastal province of Liaoning is
occasionally excluded from the coastal designation and grouped along with the other interior Manchurian
provinces of Heilongjiang and Jilin, both of which had heavily- industrialized Soviet-style economies
during the pre-reform period and have tended to lag behind in the post-reform period. Finally, Tianjin
and Shanghai are also sometimes excluded from the coastal group since they represent somewhat unique
metropolitan areas. We experimented with each of these diﬀerent coastal classiﬁcations. In the interest
of space, we report in table form only two classiﬁcations, the broadest classiﬁcation including all ten
provinces, and the narrowest classiﬁcation, including only the six non-metropolitan central coastal
provinces. In table 4 we report both the individual and group results for each of these two benchmark
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diﬀer depending on the grouping in which it is included. This is because when we test (yit − ¯ yt),t h e
value for ¯ yt.d i ﬀers depending on which other provinces are included in the group. In all cases, for
each of the coastal groupings, including the other coastal groupings not reported in table form, we were
unable to reject the null hypothesis that all of the (yit − ¯ yt) are nonstationary on the basis of any of the
tests. In other words, the evidence strongly contradicts the presumed presence of a separate coastal
convergence club regardless of which combination of coastal provinces we consider.
We also investigated the convergence properties for the interior provinces. The ﬁrst benchmark
is for all of the remaining eighteen interior provinces of our sample which do not have a coastline and
is reported in the ﬁrst two columns of results in table 5. The results for the interior provinces as a
group are somewhat mixed. The IPS tests fail to reject, while the Fisher test and several individual
provinces reject at the 5% level. The Bonferroni test easily rejects at the 1% level. This leads us
to suspect that while the interior provinces as a whole do not represent a convergence club, if there is
a convergence club, it is likely to lie among some subset of these interior provinces. Thus, we next
subdivided the interior provinces into various smaller geographic subsets, such as the six central interior
provinces, the central interior plus northeastern provinces, the central interior plus southwestern interior
provinces, the six northwestern interior provinces, and the interior provinces minus the northwestern
interior provinces. These results proved to be interesting. All of the groupings which excluded the
northwestern interior provinces uniformly failed to reject the null. In these cases, the IPS, Fisher
and Bonferroni statistics were always in agreement. By contrast, the grouping that included only the
interior, northwestern provinces was the only one of the groupings for which rejections of the null were
obtained in some cases. Speciﬁcally, for the group of northwestern provinces, the IPS test rejected
at the 10% level with a p-value of 0.074, while the Fisher statistic came close with a p-value of 0.123,
although the Bonferroni did not reject. Collectively, these results show that if a case is to made for
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at best the only possible candidate appears to be the more geographically-isolated provinces of the
northwestern interior. The individual and group test statistics for two of these interesting benchmark
cases are reported in the remaining columns of table 5, namely the subgrouping of the six northwestern
provinces and the subgrouping of the interior provinces with the northwestern ones excluded.
Next, we investigated various province subgroupings based on the extent to which preferential open-
door policies have been extended in the post-reform period. For this, we used the index constructed in
Demurger et al. (2001). Speciﬁcally, Demurger et al. construct an index ranging from 0 to 3 for each
province during the post-reform years depending on the type and extent of favored free trade zones
that are present, and report the average index value for each province over the post-reform period.
These average values range from 0.33 to 2.86, with the majority of provinces below 1.0. We divided
these into three roughly equal quantiles. This produced nine "low preference" provinces with average
index values below 0.5, plus nine "medium preference" provinces with values between 0.5 and 1.0, and
10 ”high preference” provinces with values exceeding 1.0. The assignment of provinces into these
groups is also described in table 1. As it turns out, the high preference quantile coincides exactly with
the subset of all coastal provinces. Therefore, we already know, based on the geographically-deﬁned
classiﬁcations, that this subset does not contain a convergence club, as reported in table 4. As expected,
the result continues to hold even when we exclude the most extreme high-preference provinces, Fujian
and Guangdong, which are the only two provinces with average index values in excess of 2.0.
Similarly, we already know from this that the results for the remaining eighteen medium and low-
preference provinces are mixed, since they coincide with our benchmark group of all interior provinces.
In eﬀect, therefore, the preferential policy classiﬁcation system primarily provides us with an alternative
way in which to further decompose these eighteen interior provinces, along policy groupings rather than
geographic groupings. When we do this by examining the low-preference and medium-preference
20quantiles separately, we ﬁnd another interesting result, as reported in table 6. In this case, the
low-preference provinces continue to produce weak or mixed results primarily in the direction of a
nonrejection. For example, while the Fisher and Bonferroni reject, the IPS clearly does not reject.
Among the individual province tests in this group, there are clearly two outliers: Gansu, which lies
at the extreme left tail of the distribution with a p-value close to zero, and Qinghai, which lies at
the extreme right tail of the distribution with a p-value close to one. When either or both of these
northwestern provinces are excluded, the panel results uniformly fail to reject the null, leading us to
conclude that it is unlikely that a signiﬁcant convergence group lies within this subset. By contrast, it is
the medium-preference provinces which provide us with the most likely candidate for a convergence club.
For this group of provinces, all of the tests are in agreement in rejecting the null hypothesis. The IPS,
Fisher and Bonferroni tests all reject at the 5% level or better. These are by far the strongest results in
favor of a rejection of the null among the many subgroups that were considered. Consequently, if we
are to look for a policy-based converge club in the post-reform period, it is not among the most open
high-preference coastal provinces, nor is it among the least-favored of the interior provinces. Rather,
it appears to be among the middle-of-the-road provinces, which are neither wide open to international
trade and investment nor relatively closed.
Taken together, the results paint an interesting picture for the growth pattern among the Chinese
provinces in the post-reform period. As a general phenomenon, per capita incomes among the provinces
do not appear to be converging, but rather to be diverging in the post-reform period. Furthermore, it
does not appear to be the case that this can be explained by the presence of a simple, dual-convergence
club that distinguishes between coastal and interior provinces. On the contrary, per capita incomes
in the coastal provinces do not appear to be converging toward one another regardless of which coastal
provinces we consider. Likewise, the interior provinces as a group also do not appear to be converging,
but are in general diverging. At most, there is some indication that the more geographically-isolated
21subset of these provinces, consisting of the six northwestern interior provinces, may not be diverging from
one another, so that these may represent a small subset of interior provinces that are on a common
convergence path. Similarly, when we examine the growth patterns among provinces with similar
degrees of preferential open-door policies, we ﬁnd that the quantile with the most preferential treatment
is growing along divergent paths. The least preferentially-treated quantile also does not appear to
provide much evidence for convergence as a group. Rather, the middle quantile, with a moderate
ranking for preferential policies, appears to be the most likely to contain a convergence subgroup. This
quantile varies geographically among the interior provinces, and includes several of the northwestern
provinces, along with a majority of central provinces.
Broadly speaking, many of these patterns might arguably be viewed as being roughly consistent
with the interpretations expressed by Young (2000) and elsewhere, namely that the opening up of
international trade has allowed individual provinces to grow along divergent paths despite a limited
degree of interprovincial trade and worker mobility. Young (2000) concludes, “ There is every indication
that the economy of the People’s Republic, while opening up internationally, has become fragmented
internally.” According to this interpretation, relatively limited interprovincial trade in the presence
of accelerated international trade has restricted the degree of interprovincial convergence. In most
cases that has led to diverging per capita incomes across provinces. In terms of the growth patterns
among the subgroupings of provinces, we ﬁnd that those which have been permitted to open up most
to international trade have been able to grow fastest, and have also grown along separate paths. Those
which have remained least open to trade have grown least. With little internal interprovincial trade
to induce convergence, they have remained on separate, nonconvergent growth paths. If there is any
pattern of convergence among the provinces, it is a middle quantile phenomenon. In particular, it is the
subset of provinces which have neither grown exceptionally from the opening up of international trade
nor stagnated from the lack of it that may be following a similar convergence path in the post-reform
22period. Consequently, the evidence appears to support the idea that further extending preferential open-
door policies to other provinces may further accelerate the growth process. However, it is more likely
that the freeing up of interprovincial worker mobility will facilitate convergence and lessen interprovincial
disparities in per capita incomes.
5 Concluding Remarks
China presents an important case study for examining regional income disparities that accompany rapid
economic growth. Dating from the post-reform periods that have evolved since 1978, China’s accelerated
growth rate has reinforced concerns about how to handle continued growth while also balancing regional
income inequality. This paper examines the issue of Chinese provincial income divergence using the
provincial income data set from Hsueh and Li (1999), which span both the pre-reform and post-reform
periods of Chinese economic growth. By using recent econometric developments which account for
the time series properties of the data, our primary results conﬁrm that while a signiﬁcant subset of
China’s provincial incomes appears to have been converging during the pre-reform period before 1978,
this no longer appears to have been the case. Rather since 1978, per capita incomes in the majority
of provinces appear to be diverging. In contrast to earlier empirical studies, our ﬁndings support the
view of Chinese government and of the UNDP that interprovincial inequalities have been widening since
1978. The ﬁndings are also consistent with casual observation, and are consistent with the implications
of restrictive interprovincial trade raised in Young (2000) and Demurger et al. (2001). Furthermore,
the evidence does not support the argument that the provincial patterns of growth can be explained
on the basis of a geographically-oriented, dual-convergence club consisting of the usual, coastal-versus-
interior classiﬁcation. The evidence also does not support the argument that diﬀerences in the degree
of openness to international trade account for the divergence. Rather, these results point to the idea
that other unique features of China’s experience may be important in explaining this systematic and
23persistent regional income divergence. One important question that we intend to explore in future
research is whether China’s fairly unique Hukou system of household registration may have played a
role in limiting the degree of interprovincial labor mobility.5
Historical experience elsewhere in the world suggests that few countries have succeeded in maintain-
ing political stability under conditions of severe income disparity. China’s history is full of uprisings,
rebellions, and revolutions sparked by economic inequalities. Accordingly, the existence of regional in-
come disparities is of considerable interest as it bears directly on the sustainability of economic reform
and open-door policy. The results of this study add to a growing body of literature that further con-
ﬁrms a serious potential risk if it is not addressed: that growing regional income inequality might derail
the stability of China’s economic reform process and imperil prospects for future growth. The results
5As pointed out by a referee, in general, one might expect that other omitted time varying factors could account for
the apparent lack of per capita income convergence, even after conditioning on province speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. In this sense,
one could say that the provincial per capita incomes are converging conditional on these other time varying eﬀects. In the
present context, if these omitted variables are also nonstationary but are able to explain the provincial distribution of per
capita incomes conditionally through a stable cointegrating relationship that relates per capita income and the omitted
variables, then this becomes a cointegrated panel in the sense of Pedroni (2004, 2000). In fact, this is the approach to
conditional income convergence that is explored broadly in Pedroni (2005) for the Summers and Heston multi-country
panel data. Unfortunately, for the case of China, reliable time series that are comparable in length to the provincial
GDP data are notoriously scarce for the provincial level of disaggregation. Nevertheless, this is the basic approach that is
used in the related current research of de Brauw and Pedroni (2005), which uses time variations in the relaxation of the
Chinese Haikou system of household registration to study the role of interprovincial labor mobility for conditional income
convergence.
24may also carry important implications for nations in other regions of the world that are contemplating
prospects for greater economic integration. For example, regional economic groups in Africa, Southeast
Asia, and Latin America may need to contend with the fact that more rapid growth associated with
greater openness to trade in goods and services may also be associated with greater regional income
disparity. Extrapolating from China’s experience, it may be the case that factor mobility, particularly
labor, is an important, practical ingredient in order for rapid growth to also be accompanied by regional
income convergence.
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27Figure 1: Average provincial log per capita GDP in constant 1995 Yuan prices
35Figure 2: Average interior provincial per capita incomes excluding Qinghai and Hei-
longjiang relative to Shanghai and others
36Figure 3: Average coastal versus interior provincial incomes relative to the national mean
37Figure 4: Roughly parallel growth paths of the poorest and wealthiest coastal provinces
relative to average
38Figure 5: Roughly parellel growth paths among the wealthiest and poorest interior
provinces relative to average
39Table 1: List of China￿ s Mainland Provinces and Geographic Location
Code Province Location Pref. Level
1 Beijing Interior-Central medium
2 Tianjing Coastal-Central high
3 Hebei Coastal-Central high
4 Shanxi Interior-Central low
5 Inner Mongolia Interior-NW medium
6 Liaoning Coastal-NE high
7 Jilin Interior-NE medium
8 Heilongjiang Interior-NE medium
9 Shanghai Coastal-Central high
10 Jiangsu Coastal-Central high
11 Zhejiang Coastal-Central high
12 Anhui Interior-Central medium
13 Fujian Coastal-Central high
14 Jiangxi Interior-Central low
15 Shandong Coastal-Central high
16 Henan Interior-Central low
17 Hubei Interior-Central medium
18 Hunan Interior-Central low
19 Guangdong Coastal-Central high
20 Guangxi Coastal-SW high
21 Hainan NA high
22 Sichuan Interior-SW medium
23 Guizhou Interior-SW low
24 Yunnan Interior-SW medium
25 Tibet NA NA
26 Shaanxi Interior-NW low
27 Gansu Interior-NW low
28 Qinghai Interior-NW low
29 Ningxia Interior-NW low
30 Xinjiang Interior-NW medium
40Table 2: Provincial Growth Performance during Pre-reform and Post-reform Periods
Province Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP































Average (standard deviation) 4.50 (1.567) 9.09 (1.722)
41Figure 6: Table 3. Comparison of Pre- and Post-Reform Periods
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42Figure 7: Table 4. Post Reform Coastal/High Preference Subgroupings
43Figure 8: Table 5. Post-Reform Interior Geographic Subgroupings
44Figure 9: Table 6. Post-Reform Medium and Low Preference Subgroupings
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